US forces struck Iran’s Qeshm Island in the south of the country on the day Americans voted in the midterm elections. The timing has raised a question: will a post-election Washington adjust its military strategy toward Iran, or even restart large-scale combat operations? Tensions between Washington and Tehran have run high since the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally from the Iran nuclear deal, and the risk of military conflict has never gone away. The midterm results will shape not only US domestic politics but also the White House’s room for maneuver in the Middle East.
A post-election check on Trump’s war powers
Control of Congress may shift after the midterms, which would constrain Trump’s military decision-making. If Democrats win the House or the Senate, Trump’s freedom of action on Iran will be limited. Once the new Congress is sworn in in January, it could oversee and check military operations through legislation or hearings. Some analysts therefore believe Iran may try to drag out the standoff until January, waiting for the US political landscape to change.
Trump could also use the post-election lame-duck period to take risky action and create facts on the ground. US presidents have launched military operations at the end of their terms before. But given Iran’s capacity for retaliation and the complexity of the Middle East, any large-scale military action would carry a high cost.
Iran’s asymmetric reply in the Strait of Hormuz
Iran’s counter-strategy is clear and effective: fight its own fight rather than meet the US military head-on. Instead, it targets weak points in the US position in the Middle East. In recent weeks Iran has stepped up deterrence in the Strait of Hormuz, hitting merchant ships that accept US escort or instructions; only vessels using routes designated by Iran can pass safely. Iran has also attacked US naval forces in the region, including destroyers and navy aircraft. Although the US destroyed Iranian coastal radar, Iran’s accuracy against maritime targets appears to have improved.
This asymmetric approach is a serious problem for Washington. The Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint for global oil shipping, and any disruption would hit world energy markets. JPMorgan has warned that if the US and Israel seized Iran’s Kharg Island, Iranian oil exports could be disrupted on a large scale, further shaking the global oil market. Seizing such a target would offer a visible military result for propaganda purposes, useful for Trump to show a “win.” But there is a contradiction: if Trump wants to declare victory by taking Kharg Island while also restoring Persian Gulf oil shipments to lower US gasoline prices, the two goals may conflict. Occupying oil export facilities could cost Iran revenue but might also push Iran to keep attacking energy infrastructure in other Gulf states.
No safe rear area left for the US in the Middle East
Iran’s retaliation has already reached Jordan. A THAAD system deployed in Jordan was destroyed earlier, and Iran has shown it can hit targets inside Jordanian territory. US Central Command claimed all Iranian missiles were intercepted, but images of badly damaged US bases, circulated by soldiers’ families on social media, make that hard to believe. If every missile had been intercepted, how did US bases suffer such severe damage?
The fact is that the US no longer has a “rear area” in the Middle East. From Jordan to Qatar, from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, every US gain may come with a matching cost. Iranian missiles and drones can hit US military bases, oil facilities and shipping targets in the region. The US can indeed destroy targets inside Iran, but the price is high: relations between the US and Middle Eastern countries could fracture, and oil and dollar hegemony could be shaken.
Iran’s calculation and America’s dilemma
For Iran, stalling is the best option right now — at least until the new US Congress is sworn in in January, when Trump will face more constraints and be less able to act as he pleases. By showing its ability to retaliate, Iran is warning the Trump administration of the cost of reigniting war in the Middle East, especially for shipping security in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has little left to lose; the US has much it cannot afford to lose, from its relations with Middle Eastern states to oil and dollar hegemony.
Over the past two months Iran has built deterrence in the Strait of Hormuz, widened its attacks to merchant ships and struck US naval forces in the region. These moves are meant to raise the cost of US military action and force Washington to think twice before going further.
After the midterms, a return to large-scale US combat operations against Iran cannot be ruled out, but political constraints and military risks will force the Trump administration to weigh the costs. Iran’s asymmetric retaliation and its deterrence in the Strait of Hormuz mean any military adventure could trigger a chain reaction affecting global energy markets and the geopolitical landscape. The US military presence in the Middle East faces unprecedented challenges, and post-election political change could bring new variables.
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