A column on the Chinese platform Zhihu argues that the United States is changing how it funds science and technology. Rather than trying to lead in every field, Washington is concentrating resources on areas that could prove decisive within ten years, while pushing long-term basic research to the back of the line. Whether that judgment is accurate is open to debate, but the fiscal and industrial pressures behind it are real.
Debt interest overtakes military spending
The article opens with a set of figures. Federal debt has passed $40 trillion, and interest payments in fiscal 2026 reached $1.05 trillion, exceeding military spending for the first time in history. The 10-year Treasury yield has climbed above 5%, higher than any previous Congressional Budget Office forecast. Inflation is back at 3.7%, gasoline is up 27% over a year, and the Federal Reserve raised rates on September 16. War pushes up oil prices, oil prices push up inflation, inflation forces rate hikes, and rate hikes make interest on the huge debt more expensive — a loop.
The military picture is no easier. The article says that when the US moved against Iran in February, it expected the operation to end in weeks. Instead the Strait of Hormuz closed, Brent crude briefly hit $126, and a mid-sized country dragged the world’s most powerful military into an eight-month conflict. The Navy has fewer than 300 combat vessels, and at current shipbuilding rates it may not approach Congress’s target of 355 until the mid-2040s. The article also cites US estimates that China’s shipbuilding capacity is more than 200 times that of the United States.
Manufacturing gap undercuts the lead
The article goes further: China now generates more than twice as much electricity as the US, and the UN Industrial Development Organization projects that by 2030 China will account for 45% of global manufacturing, with the US falling to 11%. The author concludes that leadership in finance, the military and narrative is hollow if it rests on the ability to make things at only half an opponent’s capacity.
In such a position, a normal country would retrench and pay down debt. But the article argues that the US, as the “boss,” cannot openly show weakness, or borrowing rates would rise, allies would realign, and domestic cohesion would fray. So it must tell a grand narrative and produce “something China doesn’t have,” to claim that an opponent leading on many measures is still behind without certain key technologies.
Betting on engineering, not science
The article’s core judgment is that the US is now investing mainly in “engineering,” not “science” — fields where money reliably produces visible results. Only military and industrial work that can beat China is considered valuable. The author singles out the White House’s “Genesis Mission” presidential action document, released in November 2025, and argues that subsequent policy basically revolves around it; to see where the US is heading, watching that one official website is enough.
This shift means basic research whose payoff is 50 years away may be postponed. For the research community, it is a trade-off in resource allocation; for industry, it means policy benefits concentrate on projects that are quantifiable and deliverable.
Questions the argument leaves open
The article offers many verifiable numbers, but simplifying a complex strategy into a single line — “set it aside until we win” — still leaves room for debate. Whether the reprioritization of science funding is as tidy as the author suggests, and how much basic research is actually being squeezed, need more evidence. What is certain is that interest on the debt exceeding military spending, the shipbuilding capacity gap, and shifts in manufacturing share are structural pressures reshaping America’s science and technology choices.
Source: Zhihu https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/2098486174755067044?utm_medium=openapi_platform&utm_source=b38f6831b176
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